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HOMOSEXUAL DIsCRIMINATION AND GENDER: WAS
ROMER V. EVANS REALLY A VICTORY FOR GAY RIGHTS?
ROBERT D. DODSON*
This article argues that while Romer v. Evans marked a victory for
gays, lesbians and bisexuals, its impact was short lived. Lower courts have
cited Romer v. Evans to uphold laws which discriminate against homosexu-
als in areas ranging from military service to employment. The argument de-
veloped in this article is that discrimination based on sexual orientation is a
form of gender discrimination requiring courts to review such laws under
intermediate scrutiny. Under this more demanding standard of review, many
of the laws lower courts uphold under the rational basis standard would be
struck down as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In Romer v. Evans the Supreme Court struck down an amendment to the
Colorado Constitution which invalidated preexisting laws prohibiting dis-
crimination based on a person's sexual orientation.' The opinion was signifi-
cant because it marked the first time the Court struck down a law which dis-
criminated against homosexuals. Commentators heralded the opinion as a
victory for gay rights and suggested that Evans went a long way in over-
turning the Court's opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick.2
While Romer v. Evans marked a short term victory for gay rights and
may show changing attitudes on the Court,3 it is doubtful the opinion is
anything more than a symbolic victory for homosexuals. The Court struck
down the Colorado Amendment using only rational basis review.' Justice
Kennedy's majority opinion refused to scrutinize laws discriminating against
homosexuals using some form of heightened scrutiny.' Following this lead,
federal courts since Romer v. Evans have evaluated discriminatory laws us-
ing rational basis review." The result is that the majority of lower federal
courts have upheld legislation discriminating against homosexuals.
Given this trend in the lower courts one should ask: Was Romer v. Ev-
ans the victory for gay rights commentators suggested? This article argues it
was not. Until the Court uses some form of heightened judicial scrutiny to
review laws discriminating against homosexuals, lower courts will continue
to validate such laws. Discrimination against homosexuals should be viewed
as a form of gender discrimination and evaluated using intermediate scru-
tiny. Such scrutiny, properly applied, would invalidate laws designed to dis-
advantage, alienate, or otherwise discriminate against homosexuals.
1. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,635 (1996).
2. See, e.g., Andrew M. Jacobs, Romer Wasn't Built in a Day: The Subtle Transforma-
tion in Judicial Argument Over Gay Rights, 1996 Wis. L. REV. 893 (1996); Akhil Reed Amar,
Attainder and Amendment 2: Romer's Rightness, 95 MICH. L. REv. 203 (1996); Kevin G.
Walsh, Comment, Throwing Stones: Rational Basis Review Triumphs Over Homophobia, 27
SETON HALL L. REv. 1064 (1997); Katherine M. Hamill, Comment, Romer v. Evans: Dulling
the Equal Protection Gloss On Bowers v. Hardwick, 77 B.U. L. REv. 655 (1997); Courtney
G. Joslin, Recent Development, Equal Protection and Anti-Gay Legislation: Dismantling the
Legacy of Bowers v. Hardwick-Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REXv. 225 (1996).
3. Justice O'Connor, who voted with the majority of the Court in Bowers v. Hardwick to
uphold a Georgia law banning homosexual sodomy, voted to overturn Amendment 2.
4. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 631-32.
5. See id. at 625-26.
6. See infra Part III.
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II. THE EVOLUTION OF ROMER V. EVANS
A. Evans v. Romer and the Colorado Supreme Court
1. Evans I and Strict Scrutiny
In May 1992, Colorado voters submitted a proposed amendment to the
Colorado Constitution.7 In relevant part, it provided:
No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian, or Bisexual Orienta-
tion. Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or depart-
ments, nor any of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or
school districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordi-
nance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, con-
duct, practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of
or entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any minority
status quota preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination. This
Section of the Constitution shall be in all respects self-executing.
8
The proposed amendment passed by a narrow margin on November 3,
1992.' Nine days after the election, a group of citizens filed suit in the Den-
ver District Court to enjoin enforcement of what became known as
"Amendment 2.'
The state district court granted plaintiffs request for a temporary re-
straining order enjoining enforcement of the newly passed amendment." The
district court concluded Amendment 2 was subject to strict scrutiny review
because it burdened a fundamental right by giving effect to private biases. 2
The State appealed the district court's temporary restraining order to the
Colorado Supreme Court. In an opinion by Chief Justice Rovira, the Colo-
rado court affirmed the issuance of the restraining order. 3 The Colorado
court held strict scrutiny should be applied in reviewing the statute because
Amendment 2 burdened the fundamental right of all citizens to participate in
the political process. 4
In reaching its decision, the Colorado court relied on a number of U.S.
Supreme Court decisions. 5 In Reynolds v. Sims, the Court struck down an
Alabama vote apportionment scheme for state elections.'6 The apportionment
scheme gave residents in certain parts of the state more representatives per
7. See Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1272 (Colo. 1993) [hereinafter Evans 1J.
8. See id.
9. See id. The amendment passed 813,966 to 710,151 votes or 53.4% to 46.6%. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id. at 1273.
12. See id. at 1273-74.
13. See id. at 1286.
14. Evans I, 854 P.2d at 1286.
15. See id. at 1276.
16. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
3
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capita than residents in other parts of the state and had the effect of giving
white citizens more voting strength than black voters. 7 The Court reasoned
such a scheme violated the equal protection clause because some voters had
more influence over elections than other voters." According to the Reynolds
Court, equal protection requires vote apportionment to be based on popula-
tion, not geographic location. 9 A companion case, Lucas v. Colorado Gen-
eral Assembly,0 established that a vote apportionment scheme similar to the
one invalidated in Reynolds could not survive an equal protection challenge
simply because it was approved by state voters in a referendum.2
In a second line of cases, the Court limited the restrictions states could
impose on citizens' rights to vote.' Between 1966 and 1972, the Court
struck down legislation which restricted the vote through imposition of a
poll tax,23 unreasonably long residency requirements,24 and a restriction that
limited voters in a school board election to those who owned or leased prop-
erty or were parents in the school district.'
Finally, the Colorado court cited a line of cases establishing that a ma-
jority of the electorate could not change the political process in order to keep
certain groups from passing favorable legislation.2" In Hunter v. Erickson,
the Court struck down an amendment to the Akron city charter.2' The
amendment provided that any ordinance dealing with racial discrimination in
housing had to first be approved by a majority of voters before it became ef-
fective.28 The amendment was passed in response to a fair housing ordinance
passed by the Akron City Council prohibiting racial discrimination.29 Fol-
lowing Hunter, the Court invalidated a Seattle law restricting busing to inte-
grate its schools.3 Washington v. Seattle School District invalidated a
Washington state law which essentially preempted a Seattle busing plan im-
plemented to undo defacto desegregation in the schools.3 A bare majority of
Justices concluded the law could not pass constitutional muster as it changed
the normal operation of the political process in order to prevent a particular
group from achieving favorable legislation.32
17. See id. at 538.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. 377 U.S. 713 (1964).
21. See id.
22. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1086-91 (2d ed. 1986).
23. See Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
24. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
25. See Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
26. See Evans 1, 854 P.2d at 1279-81.
27. 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
28. See id. at 386.
29. See id.
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In its ruling, the Colorado court acknowledged that each line of Su-
preme Court cases was distinguishable from Amendment 2." But it argued
the common principle established by these cases was that "laws may not cre-
ate unequal burdens on identifiable groups with respect to the right to par-
ticipate in the political process absent a compelling state interest. ' '" The
court also acknowledged that the group at issue in the lines of cases cited
was often a racial minority. 5 It nevertheless contended that this principle,
while typically used to strike down legislation burdening racial minorities,
was not limited to race. 6 Accordingly, Chief Justice Rovira used strict scru-
tiny to evaluate the amendment's constitutionality.7
In reviewing the district court's issuance of a temporary restraining or-
der, the Colorado court found Amendment 2 was not supported by a com-
pelling state interest and was not narrowly tailored. The court found the
immediate purpose of Amendment 2 was to remove homosexuals from the
normal political process in order to keep them from participating in that pro-
cess.39 Only homosexuals have the burden of amending the state constitution
before passing favorable legislation.' Such a requirement places a burden on
homosexuals which no other group in the state faces.4' The only real purpose
the court was able to decipher from Amendment 2 was a bare desire to dis-
criminate against homosexuals.
In addition to finding that Amendment 2 lacked any legitimate purpose,
the court rejected the state's claim that Amendment 2 was narrowly tai-
lored. 3 The language used is sweeping in scope.' It repealed existing legis-
lation prohibiting discrimination against homosexuals. '5 Amendment 2 also
prohibited the passage of future legislation barring discrimination against
homosexuals. ' Accordingly, the court concluded it was improbable
Amendment 2 could survive strict scrutiny review after a full hearing on the
merits.'7 It affirmed the district court's temporary restraining order prohibit-
ing enforcement of Amendment 2 until a full hearing on the merits could be
concluded.48
33. See Evans I, 854 P.2d at 1279.
34. Id.
35. See id. at 1281.
36. See id. at 1281-82.
37. See id. at 1279.
38. See id. at 1283-84.
39. See id. at 1285.
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See id. at 1285-86.
43. See id. at 1284-85.
44. See id.
45. See id. at 1284.
46. See id.
47. See id. at 1286.
48. See id.
5
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Justice Erickson dissented in Evans L49 He argued that the three lines of
cases relied upon by the majority for its decision were best explained by ref-
erence to suspect classifications such as race or clearly articulated rights ac-
knowledged by the Supreme Court." No suspect class was burdened by
Amendment 2, and the court had never explicitly articulated the "funda-
mental right" of political participation that the majority relied upon in
reaching its decision.5 In Bowers v. Hardwick, the Court stated that there
should be "great resistance" to the expansion of federal rights based on ex-
pansive readings of the Due Process or Equal Protection clauses.' Justice
Erickson argued the court had refused to acknowledge fundamental rights in
areas including education, housing, welfare, and government employment.'
Based on what he saw as a narrow interpretation by the court of fundamental
rights, he argued it was improbable the court would recognize the right to
political participation as fundamental and deserving of strict scrutiny.55
Justice Erickson was also troubled by the fact that the Colorado court
had been the first court to articulate such a right.56 He contended it was not
the job of the State Supreme Court to create new fundamental rights even
when such rights are fairly inferred from federal case law.' Justice Erickson
would have evaluated Amendment 2 by the rational basis standard of review
and would have reversed the trial court's temporary injunction pending a full
trial. 8
2. Evans II-Application of Strict Scrutiny
Following Evans I, the case was remanded to the Denver District
Court. 9 On remand, the State proffered six interests it claimed were compel-
ling and justified Amendment 2.' It argued Amendment 2 was passed (1) to
deter factionalism, (2) to preserve the integrity of the State's political func-
tions, (3) to preserve the State's resources to fight discrimination against
suspect classes, (4) to prevent government interference with personal, fa-
milial, or religious privacy, (5) to prevent government from subsidizing spe-
cial interest group legislation, and (6) to promote the overall well being of
children.6' The state district court accepted only the claim that protection of
49. See Evans 1, 854 P.2d at 1286 (Erickson, J., dissenting).
50. See id. at 1289-93.
51. See id. at 1287.
52. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
53. See id. at 195.
54. See Evans 1, 854 P.2d at 1291 (Erickson, J., dissenting).
55. See id. at 1292.
56. See id. at 1301.
57. See id.
58. See id. at 1302.
59. Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1339 (Colo. 1994) [hereinafter Evans I1].
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family relationships and religious beliefs were compelling interests. 2 How-
ever, it invalidated Amendment 2 because it found the amendment was not
narrowly tailored to promote these interests.' The state appealed to the Colo-
rado Supreme Court on several grounds."
On appeal, the Colorado court affrnmed its initial ruling in Evans 1, and
held Amendment 2 was properly reviewed by the district court under the
strict scrutiny standard.' To survive strict scrutiny, proponents of a law must
show it is necessary to promote a compelling government interest and it is
narrowly tailored to promote that interest.' The State first contended
Amendment 2 promoted the sanctity of religious, familial, and personal pri-
vacy.' It argued many people were morally and religiously opposed to ho-
mosexuals and their lifestyle and that such people should not be forced to
accommodate homosexuals by renting property to them or hiring them." The
Colorado court found that even if this was the aim of Amendment 2, it was
not narrowly tailored.69 Such objectives could be accomplished through less
restrictive amendments to existing legislation, which prohibited discrimina-
tion against homosexuals." The court also rejected the State's contention
that Amendment 2 was passed to protect family values.7 ' Simply because
citizens have a right to familial privacy does not give them the right to have
the government endorse those values.72 Finally, the court rejected the claim
that Amendment 2 was passed to preserve personal privacy. 3 Writing for the
majority, Justice Rovira concluded that even if property owners or employ-
ers could not discriminate against homosexuals in renting property or in em-
ployment, the invasion of privacy was so limited and narrow that protecting
it did not constitute a compelling state interest. 4
The Colorado court easily dismissed the State's argument that Amend-
ment 2 was designed to preserve financial resources to fight discrimination
against suspect classes such as racial minorities.75 As the court noted, pro-
tecting financial resources is not a compelling state interest.7 6 Nor was
Amendment 2 necessary or narrowly tailored to achieve this goal.77 The
62. See id.
63. See id. at 1340-41.
64. See id. at 1341.
65. See id.
66. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
67. See Evans 1H, 882 P.2d at 1342.
68. See id.
69. See id. at 1342-43.
70. See id. at 1343.
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See id. at 1344.
74. See id. at 1345.
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. See id. at 1346.
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court also rejected the State's claim that Amendment 2 promoted the estab-
lishment of public and private norms of acceptable behavior." Such interests
had never been recognized as "compelling" state interests, and in the court's
view, Amendment 2 was not necessary in promoting such norms of behav-
ior.79
The majority in Evans II went on to reject the State's claim that
Amendment 2 curbed factionalism and government support for special inter-
ests."0 The court held neither purported objective was a compelling state in-
terest.8 Nor could it be said that Amendment 2 was necessary or narrowly
tailored to meet these objectives.2 The Justices also argued that the State's
purported interests in Amendment 2 were insufficient, when combined, to
overcome strict scrutiny.83
Finally, the court rejected the State's Tenth Amendment claim. ' Propo-
nents of Amendment 2 argued the rights at issue in Amendment 2 were
uniquely state rights under the Tenth Amendment because they involved the
state constitution.85 Accordingly, they contended federal constitutional law
was not applicable. 6 The court did not accept this argument, reasoning that
"States have no compelling interest in amending their constitutions in ways
that violate fundamental federal rights.""
In an odd concurrence, Justice Scott argued Amendment 2 should be
held unconstitutional based on the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the
Constitution.88 He contended Amendment 2 burdened the right to "peaceably
assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances" and there-
fore violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause. 9 The Privileges and
Immunities Clause has rarely been used to invalidate legislation." Since the
Court's initial interpretation of the clause in the Slaughter House Cases,91 it
has invalidated only one state law based on the clause.' That case involved a
state tax law and was overruled five years later.93 Nevertheless, Justice Scott
argued the history of the Privileges and Immunities Clause indicated the
Framers' intention that the clause extend to more than the limited rights rec-
78. See id. at 1346-47.
79. See Evans 11, 882 P.2d at 1347.
80. See id. at 1348-49.
81. See id. at 1348.




86. See id. at 1350.
87. Id.
88. See id. at 1351 (Scott, J., concurring).
89. See id.
90. See TRIBE, supra note 22, §§ 7-2 to 7-4, at 548-59.
91. 83 U.S. 36 (1873).
92. See Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404 (1935).
93. See TRIBE, supra note 22, § 7-4, at 556-57.
[Vol. 35
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ognized by the Court in the Slaughter House Cases.94 He failed to explain
why, after over a hundred years of settled law, the Privileges and Immunities
Clause should be revamped by a state supreme court.95
Justice Erickson dissented in Evans ."96 His dissent did not question in-
validating Amendment 2 once strict scrutiny was invoked.' He questioned
invoking strict scrutiny review at all.98 He argued that the fundamental right
of political participation the majority relied upon to ratchet up the standard
of judicial review from the ordinary rational basis standard to strict scrutiny
had never been acknowledged as a fundamental right by the U.S. Supreme
Court or any federal circuit court." Justice Erickson also suggested it was
significant that Amendment 2 was passed directly by Colorado voters and
not the Colorado legislature.'" He contended the courts should give more le-
niency when reviewing popularly enacted laws such as Amendment 2.2"1 He
would have reviewed Amendment 2 under the rational basis standard.'
Once properly reviewed under that standard, Justice Erickson claimed
Amendment 2 bore a rational relationship to protecting religious freedom,
preserving state resources to fight discrimination against protected classes,
and promoting uniformity in state law. 3
B. Romer v. Evans-More Confusion in Already Muddied Water
On appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court a number of arguments were
made. " The State contended the Colorado court improperly reviewed
Amendment 2 under the strict scrutiny standard. 5 It argued the Court had
never recognized the "fundamental right" of political participation that the
Colorado court relied on in justifying strict scrutiny review.' 5 In addition, no
federal court had ever recognized homosexuals as a "suspect class" requiring
94. See Evans 11, 882 P.2d at 1355-56 (Scott, J., concurring).
95. See id.
96. See id. at 1356 (Erickson, J., dissenting).
97. See id. at 1356-66.
98. See id. at 1356-57.
99. See id. at 1359-60.
100. See id. at 1356.
101. See id.
102. See id. at 1366.
103. See id. at 1362-66.
104. See Brief of Petitioners, Romer v. Evans, No. 94-1039, 1995 WL 310026; Brief of
Respondents, Romer v. Evans, No. 94-1039, 1995 WL 417786; Brief for Respondents, City
of Aspen and City Council of Aspen, Romer v. Evans, No. 94-1039, 1995 WL 370335; Ami-
cus Brief of Lamda Legal Defense Fund, Romer v. Evans, No. 94-1039, 1995 WL 782809;
Amicus Brief of Professors Tribe, Ely, Gunther, Kurland and Sullivan, Romer v. Evans, No.
94-1039, 1995 WL 862021; Petitioners' Reply Brief, Romer v. Evans, No. 94-1039, 1995 WL
466395 [hereinafter Romer Briefs].
105. See Brief of Petitioners, Romer v. Evans, No. 94-1039, 1995 WL 310026, at *10-
106. Seeid. at*10-11.
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the courts to apply strict scrutiny."° The State argued Amendment 2 should
have been reviewed under rational basis review.' It offered three rationales
for the amendment.'" Amendment 2 protected State resources to fight other
types of discrimination, promoted a uniform rule state wide, and allowed
landowners and religious institutions freedom to exclude homosexuals be-
cause they found their lifestyle offensive."'
Opponents to Amendment 2 defended the Colorado court's decision, ar-
guing that Amendment 2 was subject to strict scrutiny because its effect bur-
dened the fundamental rights of all citizens to political participation."' They
also claimed that if Amendment 2 was subject only to rational basis review,
it was unconstitutional."' The only real purpose advanced was a desire to
undermine homosexual influence in the political process and this was not a
legitimate state interest."3
An amicus brief submitted by a number of organizations dedicated to
gay, lesbian, and bisexual rights argued that the Court should consider ho-
mosexuals a suspect class and apply heightened scrutiny to Amendment 2.""
The brief argued that the Court had never specified what characteristics were
necessary for a group to be considered a suspect class."5 Nevertheless, in
various decisions, the Court hinted at characteristics relevant to the in-
quiry."6 Citing Frontiero v. Richardson, amici argued that when a charac-
teristic bears "no relation to the individual's ability to participate in and
contribute to society," strict scrutiny review should be considered."' In addi-
tion, homosexuals, like minorities and women, had historically suffered dis-
crimination."8 They further contended homosexuality was an immutable
characteristic, and that the group had traditionally been politically power-
less." 9 These factors, when combined, were sufficient justifications for the
Court to apply heightened scrutiny to Amendment 2 and other laws classi-
fying citizens according to their sexual orientation.20 The brief also distin-
guished Bowers v. Hardwick on the ground that Hardwick applied only to
107. Seeid. at*l1.
108. See id. at*10.
109. See id. at*12-13.
110. Seeid.




114. See Amicus Brief of Lambda Legal Defense Fund, Romer v. Evans, No. 94-1039,
1995 WL 782809, at *5.
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. See id. at *9.
118. See Amicus Brief, 1995 WL 782809, at *10.
119. See id. at*15-21.
120. See id. at *25.
280 [Vol. 35
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sodomy.' Homosexuality, amici argued, was not defined by the specific act
of homosexual sodomy.12 The brief pointed to the fact that studies showed
many people with homosexual tendencies had never engaged in homosexual
sodomy.2" In addition, practicing homosexuals were lawfully entitled to en-
gage in other types of simple love not involving sodomy." Finally, they dis-
tinguished Hardwick arguing it was decided based on the Due Process
Clause and held only that there was no protected privacy interest recognizing
homosexual sodomy under the Due Process Clause."
In large part, the Court's opinion ignored most of these arguments.'
Justice Kennedy, writing for a six Justice majority, invalidated Amendment
2 based on other grounds. 27 The "fundamental right" of political participa-
tion that the Colorado court claimed was "clearly ... guarantee[ed]" by the
Equal Protection Clause 2 1 was not acknowledged or discussed by the
Court.29 Instead, Justice Kennedy appeared to adopt a position taken by Pro-
fessors Tribe, Ely, Gunther, Kurland, and Sullivan in an amicus brief'3
These scholars claimed Amendment 2 was a per se violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment's guarantee to equal protection under the law.' In their
view, invalidation of Amendment 2 rested not in the Court's traditional three
tiered approach to Equal Protection challenges, but "flow[ed] directly from
the plain meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment's text."'3 They argued
Amendment 2 singled out a class of persons and rendered them completely
ineligible for protection under state law.'33 The brief pointed out that
Amendment 2's sweep went beyond repealing past legislation designed to
protect homosexuals.'34 It gave homosexuals no protection from discrimina-
tion and removed them from protection under the law that all other citizens
of the state enjoyed.'35
The Court's analysis seized on these ideas, and Justice Kennedy's ma-
jority opinion gave little discussion of rational basis review."' Instead, theCourt emphasized the odd nature of Amendment 2 and the hardship it
121. See id. at *25-30.
122. See id. at *28.
123. See id. at *29.
124. See id. at *29-30.
125. See id. at *25-28.
126. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 623-27.
127. See id.
128. Evans H, 854 P.2d at 1276.
129. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 621-30.
130. See Amicus Brief of Professors Tribe, Ely, Gunther, Kurland, and Sullivan, Romer
v. Evans, No. 94-1039, 1995 WL 862021, at *1.
131. See id.
132. See id. at *4.
133. See id.
134. See id. at *6 n.3.
135. See id. at *8-10.
136. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 621-30.
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worked on homosexuals.'37 Most of the Court's discussion explained the ex-
pansive language used in Amendment 2.38 The Court argued Amendment 2
went far beyond repealing past legislation benefiting gays, lesbians, and bi-
sexuals.' 39 It also prevented any future legislation with a similar effect short
of a constitutional amendment.'" What most troubled the Court was its belief
that Amendment 2 removed homosexuals from protections of laws prevent-
ing arbitrary discrimination.'4 ' Such laws would include statutes preventing
unfair discrimination in insurance, arbitrary and capricious action by state
agencies, and discrimination by state employers based on traits other than
merit.4 The Court emphasized that a state had no legitimate purpose in
completely removing a select group of citizens from the general protection
of discrimination laws.'
43
Justice Kennedy went on to reject Colorado's claim that Amendment 2
did nothing more than prevent homosexuals from receiving special treatment
under the law.'" He reasoned that the expansive nature of Amendment 2 did
far more than merely prevent homosexuals from gaining special treatment.'45
Instead, he read Amendment 2 as removing homosexuals from general pro-
tection under all statutes passed to prevent arbitrary and capricious discrimi-
nation.' 46 According to Justice Kennedy, this fact meant Amendment 2 did
more than strip homosexuals of "special rights" and prevent them from ob-
taining special rights through future legislation. Amendment 2 afforded ho-
mosexuals less protection under the law than other citizens enjoyed.'47
By removing homosexuals from the general protection of antidiscrimi-
nation laws, Amendment 2 essentially separated homosexuals from the rest
of the population, creating two classes of unequal citizens. 48 Quoting Justice
Harlan's famous dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, the Court reasoned that the
law "neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens."'49 It argued
Amendment 2 was so broad in scope it could be read as nothing more than
an attempt to single out a politically and socially unpopular group of citizens
and deny that group equal protection under the laws.'50 A bare desire to harm
a politically unpopular group was not a legitimate purpose and could not
137. See id. at 627-35.
138. See id.
139. See id. at 624.
140. See id. at 631.
141. See id. at 630.
142. See id.
143. See id. at 626-27.
144. See id. at 627.
145. See id. at 623-3 1.
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 621-30.
149. See id. at 622 (citing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissent-
ing)).
150. See id. at 633-34.
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withstand even minimal constitutional scrutiny."'
In an angry and bitter dissent, Justice Scalia called the majority opinion
"ridiculous," "facially absurd," and "terminal[ly] sill[y]."'52 Justice Scalia
accused Justice Kennedy of undermining the democratic process through
intellectual elitism, and he called the majority opinion "nothing short of pre-
posterous" and "insulting" to Colorado citizens.'53 Justice Scalia's venomous
rhetoric aside, the dissent took Justice Kennedy to task on a number of issues
unique to Amendment 2 and homosexual rights.'"
Justice Scalia contended that the majority's reasoning was anomalous
given the Court's prior ruling in Bowers v. Hardwick.' He noted that the
majority did not overrule Hardwick and in fact had failed to even cite Hard-
wick.'56 Justice Scalia argued that if a state could pass laws outlawing the
very act of homosexual sodomy, surely it could "preserve traditional sexual
mores against the efforts of a politically powerful minority to revise those
mores through use of the laws.'
Justice Scalia also complained that the Court gave an unnecessarily
broad reading to Amendment 2.15 In his eyes the amendment did nothing
more than repeal existing legislation and prevent future legislation giving
homosexuals "special treatment."'59 According to Justice Scalia's reading of
Amendment 2, it did not remove homosexuals from general protections un-
der Colorado law as the Court concluded."w Homosexuals, like any other
group, would be protected under Colorado laws preventing arbitrary and ca-
pricious discrimination. 6' A law requiring pensions to be paid to retiring
state employees would apply equally to all citizens regardless of sexual ori-
entation." In short, Justice Scalia claimed the sweeping scope of Amend-
ment 2, which so troubled the majority, was not consistent with how
Amendment 2 had been interpreted by the Colorado Supreme Court.63 At the
very least, he believed the majority should evaluate Amendment 2 based on
the Colorado court's interpretation, and he claimed the majority reading of
Amendment 2 "finds no support in law or logic."'"
151. See id.
152. Id. at 639, 647 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 636, 652.
154. See id. at 636-53.
155. See id. at 640-44.
156. See id. at 636-40 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
157. See id. at 636.
158. See id. at 636-40.
159. See id. at 638.
160. See id. at 636.
161. See id.
162. See id.
163. See id. Justice Scalia quoted the majority opinion in the Colorado court. In a foot-
note, the Colorado Supreme Court stated, "[o]f course Amendment 2 is not intended to have
any effect on [general legislation], but seeks only to prevent the adoption of antidiscrimina-
tion laws intended to protect gays, lesbians, and bisexuals." Evans 11, 882 P.2d at 1346 n.9.
164. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 640 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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The dissent also contended that the Court's decision undermined the
democratic process specifically recognized in the Constitution." Justice
Scalia pointed out that Amendment 2 was adopted by a majority of Colorado
voters."6 He argued homosexuals comprised considerably less than 50% of
the population, but claimed considerably more influence in the democratic
process. 67 He contended homosexuals in Colorado were able to use that pro-
cess to seek legislation favorable to them.'68 The influence gays and bisexu-
als exercise in the democratic process is legitimate, and Justice Scalia con-
tended these groups were free to seek favorable legislation." He argued
homosexuals, like any other group, "are subject to being countered by law-
ful, democratic countermeasures as well."'70 Justice Scalia lambasted the
majority for undermining democracy when homosexuals had the full right to
participate in the process that produced Amendment 2.2"'
C. What was the Court Trying to Say? Interpreting Romer v. Evans
The Romer v. Evans litigation evidences considerable confusion among
the various courts. While six Justices on the Supreme Court agreed Amend-
ment 2 was unconstitutional based on rational basis review, that view was
not shared by any of the lower courts that interpreted Amendment 2.2 The
lower courts themselves agreed the act was unconstitutional, but they could
not agree on a common ground for invalidating Amendment 2.'" At least
three independent grounds were offered by state court judges as to why
Amendment 2 was unconstitutional. The state district court that initially
heard arguments on Amendment 2 entered a temporary restraining order
prohibiting enforcement of Amendment 2 based largely on First Amendment
grounds.' This rationale was abandoned by the State Supreme Court which
invalidated Amendment 2 based on the Fourteenth Amendment and strict
scrutiny review."' Not all the Justices on the court agreed on this approach.'"
Justice Scott's concurring opinion in Evans II indicated he would have in-
validated the amendment using the Privileges and Immunities Clause.'78
Commentators have also disagreed over exactly why Amendment 2 is un-
165. See id. at 644-47.
166. See id. at 647.
167. See id. at 644-47.
168. See id.
169. See id. at 646.
170. See id.
171. See id. at 644-47.
172. See Evans 1l, 882 P.2d 1335; Evans , 854 P.2d 1270.
173. See id.
174. See id.
175. See Evans I, 854 P.2d at 1273.
176. See Evans II, 882 P.2d at 1350.
177. See id. at 1351 (Scott, J., concurring); id. at 1356 (Erickson, J., dissenting).
178. See id. at 1351 (Scott, J., concurring).
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constitutional."' Professor Amar supports Justice Kennedy's analysis but ar-
gues the case is better understood as invalidating Amendment 2 based on the
Attainder clause of Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution.' Even those
Justices on the Colorado court that agreed Amendment 2 should be reviewed
under the Equal Protection clause could not agree over what standard of re-
view to apply.18 The only agreement between the Colorado court and the
Supreme Court came in the dissenting opinions.'82 The dissenters in each
case would have upheld Amendment 2 applying rational basis review.' 3 Per-
haps what is most perplexing about the litigation is that the dissenting Jus-
tices on the Colorado court and six majority Justices of the U.S. Supreme
Court purported to apply the same rational basis test but they nevertheless
reached opposite conclusions.'84
The majority decision and its use of rational basis review is odd consid-
ered on its own. Justice Kennedy's constitutional analysis left many ques-
tions unresolved. The Court's opinion did not address the issue of whether
homosexuals were a suspect class." Despite the fact that the issue was
briefed, the Court side stepped the question and invalidated Amendment 2
on other grounds.'86 The majority opinion also gave little consideration to the
Colorado court's holding that Amendment 2 burdened a fundamental right
and was subject to strict scrutiny review." Instead, the Court purported to
proceed by applying rational basis review, but the opinion itself departed
substantially from the Court's typical rational basis analysis.'
In reviewing laws under rational basis review, the Court examines
whether there could be a legitimate government interest promoted by the law
and whether the law is rationally related to promoting that interest.89 Typi-
cally, the Court has not concerned itself with the actual purpose behind a
law. 90 It has reviewed laws with an eye towards legitimacy, upholding laws
179. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 2; Toni M. Massaro, Gay Rights, Thick and Thin, 49
STAN. L. REV. 45 (1996); Jacobs, supra note 2; Kenji Yoshino, Suspect Symbols: The Literary
Argument For Heightened Scrutiny For Gays, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 1753 (1996).
180. See Amar, supra note 2.
181. See Evans I, 854 P.2d 1270.
182. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Evans 1, 854 P.2d at 1286
(Erickson, J. dissenting).
183. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 636; Evans 1, 854 P.2d at 1286.
184. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 631-33; Evans II, 882 P.2d at 1356 (Erickson, J., dissent-
ing).
185. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 623-36.
186. See id.
187. See id. at 625-26.
188. See id. at 623-36.
189. See TRIBE, supra note 22, § 16-3, at 1443-45.
190. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176 (1983) (concluding that statute
would be sustained if classification would promote a legitimate state purpose, regardless of
the actual purpose of the statute); Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1959) (holding no
denial of equal protection where classification was based on a difference having fair and sub-
stantial relation to legislative objective).
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when any set of facts support a legitimate purpose.'9 ' In Minnesota v. Clover
Leaf Creamery,' for example, a Minnesota statute prohibited the sale of
milk in plastic containers. 1 3 The legislative history behind the statute showed
quite clearly it was designed to help Minnesota's pulp wood industry by
forcing milk producers to use paper milk cartons instead of plastic jugs.94
The Court upheld the statute on the ground that Minnesota could have be-
lieved plastic jugs posed disposal problems because they were not biode-
gradable. '"
However, the Court has been less deferential to laws that effect more
than economic interests.'96 Most notably, in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center,'97 the Court overturned a city decision not to grant a zoning
permit to a group of mentally retarded citizens for a group home.' The city
defended its action on the ground that if the group home were built the
mentally retarded residents might suffer abuse from children at a nearby
school.'" The city also claimed the zoning permit was denied because the lot
where the group wanted to build was located on a flood plain." The Court
rejected these reasons noting that the neighborhood school had mentally re-
tarded students who attended special classes there, and the flood plain al-
ready had a number of residents living there, including group homes similar
to the one the plaintiffs wanted to build.2"' Justice White's majority opinion
went on to determine that the actual purpose behind the city's action
stemmed from "an irrational prejudice against [those] mentally retarded."2°0
This, the Court concluded, was not a legitimate state purpose and could not
support the city's action even under the normally deferential rational basis
standard. 3
In Romer v. Evans, the Court was presented with evidence showing
Amendment 2 was passed based on the same type of "irrational prejudice"
present in Cleburne." Like the mentally retarded, homosexuals have suf-
fered a history of discrimination and prejudice against them.2 5 Amendment
191. See TRIBE, supra note 22, § 16-3, at 1444.
192. 449 U.S. 456 (1981).
193. See id. at 458.
194. See id. at 460.
195. See id. at 474.
196. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985); Depart-
ment of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
197. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
198. See id. at 435.
199. See id. at 448-50.
200. See id.
201. See id. at 450.
202. See id.
203. See id.
204. 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996).
205. See Amicus Brief of Lamda Legal Defense Fund, Romer v. Evans, No. 94-1039,
1995 WL 782809, at *3.
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2's history is also disturbing." It was first initiated by a conservative politi-
cal group known as Coloradans for Family Values." Tony Marco, the
group's founder, explained that Amendment 2 was adopted to "fend off
'militant gay aggression."' 203 The group defended the proposed amendment
to voters on the ground that homosexuals were morally "depraved persons"
undermining traditional family values.2" This group claimed Amendment 2
would "close the lid" forever on gay rights in Colorado."' Based on
Amendment 2's history, the Colorado court invalidated it on the ground that
it "sought to deny an independently identifiable group's right to participate
equally in the political process."2 "
Nevertheless, the Court did not evaluate the specific purposes behind
Amendment 2 postulated by the State.2 The State's primary argument was
that Amendment 2 protected its financial resources and ensured the auton-
omy of individuals who found homosexuals as a group offensive and wanted
to exclude them from private business and property."3 In the past, the Court
has readily accepted similar reasons as legitimate and has probed no deeper
to look at a state's actual purpose. 4 The Court did hint that Amendment 2's
actual purpose was not to promote the interests claimed by the State. 5 But
the Court grounded its decision squarely on what Amendment 2 did to ho-
mosexuals, not why the amendment was passed by voters.1 Justice Kennedy
was wise to avoid such an analysis. Commentators have been critical of the
Cleburne approach and the Court's occasional practice of looking at actual
purpose.2"7 Moreover, given the fact that Amendment 2 was popularly passed
by state voters, determining actual purpose would have proved an impossible
task."8
Instead, Justice Kennedy's majority opinion concentrated on the pecu-
liar aspects of Amendment 2.219 In his words, Amendment 2 was a
"[s]weeping and comprehensive" change in the law." In oral arguments, the
206. See Brief of Respondents, City of Aspen and City Council of Aspen, Romer v. Ev-





211. Evans H, 882 P.2d at 1349.
212. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 623-36.
213. See Brief of Petitioner, Romer v. Evans, No. 94-1039, 1995 WL 310026.
214. See TRIBE, supra note 22, § 16-2, at 1439-54.
215. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 635.
216. See id. at 1623-29.
217. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 22, § 16-3, at 1445. "The lack of openly acknowledged
criteria for heightened scrutiny permits arbitrary use of the type of inquiry undertaken in
Cleburne, for which courts will remain essentially unaccountable." Id.
218. See id.
219. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 623-36.
220. Id. at 627.
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Justices expressed the same concern over Amendment 2.221 According to the
Court, the real problem with Amendment 2 stemmed from the fact that it is
"too narrow and too broad."222 The Court's opinion makes clear that
Amendment 2 removes an entire class of citizens from a particular type of
protection under the laws.223 In the Court's eyes, it is both over inclusive and
under inclusive.2u The Court did not explain why this was fatal to Amend-
ment 2.2" Under the Court's traditional rational basis analysis, simply be-
cause a law is under inclusive or over inclusive does make it unconstitu-
tional.226 For example, in Williamson v. Lee Optical,227 the Court reviewed an
Oklahoma statute which permitted only optometrists to fit lenses in eye
glasses.228 Those challenging the statute argued that it was under inclusive
and failed to prevent all the harms it was addressed at combating."9 The
Court rejected this argument stating that a law aimed at reform "may take
one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems
most acute."'" The Court has also been unwilling to invalidate laws because
they are over inclusive.23" ' In New York Transit Authority v. Beazer,232 the
Court upheld a New York City Transit Authority regulation that barred re-
covering narcotic addicts from employment for safety reasons2 3 The Court
noted that the majority of recovering addicts were safe, but rejected the ar-
gument that over inclusiveness violated the Equal Protection Clause.' In
short, all the Court has required is that a statute have some relationship to
promoting a legitimate state interest.235 The Court has generally not con-
cerned itself with whether a law is under or over inclusive.23 6
Romer v. Evans departed from this approach.237 The Court invalidated
Amendment 2 precisely because it was so sweeping in scope.238 What trou-
bled the Court was not simply the fact that Amendment 2 was over and un-
der inclusive.3 9 Rather, it was the degree of over and under inclusiveness
221. See Transcript of Oral Arguments, Romer v. Evans, No. 94-1039, 1995 WL
605822, at *4-8.
222. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 633.
223. See id.
224. See id.
225. See id. at 1623-29.
226. See TRIBE, supra note 22, § 16-4, at 1446-50.
227. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
228. See id.
229. See id. at 486.
230. Id. at 489.
231. See TRIBE, supra note 22, § 16-4, at 1446-50.
232. 440 U.S. 568 (1979).
233. See id.
234. See id. at 575, 592.
235. See TRIBE, supra note 22, § 16-4, at 1446-50.
236. See id.
237. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 623-36.
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which most concerned the Justices.' ° Never in the Court's history had it
been faced with a law that had such far reaching effects. 4' At oral argu-
ments, the first question asked by the Justices concerned the all inclusive
nature of Amendment 2. "I've never seen a case like this. Is there any prece-
dent that you can cite to the Court where we've upheld a law such as this?"' 42
Later in oral arguments, a Justice inquired: "[I]n all of U.S. history there has
never been any legislation like this that earmarks a group and says, you will
not be able to appeal to your State legislatures to improve your status. You
will need a constitutional change to do that."' 3 Justice Kennedy's opinion
outlines in detail just how many statutory laws were invalidated or changed
by Amendment 2." The effect is so great that Amendment 2 could not be
saved under even the most deferential standard of Equal Protection review.45
The sweeping scope of Amendment 2 gave the Court the toe hold it
needed to invalidate the amendment using rational basis review. Despite
Justice Scalia's dissent, the majority decision was not unprecedented, even if
it was somewhat unusual. The Court has invalidated other laws less sweep-
ing in scope that burdened more than mere economic interests 2 6 But the
Court's preoccupation with the sweeping scope of Amendment 2 is precisely
the problem with the opinion. The Court clearly means to invalidate laws
like Amendment 2 which remove an entire group of citizens from the gen-
eral protection of state laws. The Court did not make it clear or even suggest
what other types of laws might also be invalid using the same rational. The
majority opinion provides little guidance as to what laws fall within the
scope of Romer v. Evans and which laws are valid and fall outside its scope.
Exactly how sweeping a law must be before it falls within the parameters of
Romer v. Evans is left unanswered by the majority. Moreover, the Court's
departure from standard rational basis review has left courts and commenta-
tors with little precedent to turn to for answers. This has resulted in consid-
erable confusion, especially given the fact that the Court has not ruled on
any other laws similar to Amendment 2. While Justice Kennedy and the
majority took a brave step by invalidating Amendment 2, they left lower
courts with unbridled discretion to interpret Romer v. Evans.
III. HOMOSEXUAL RIGHTS AFTER ROMER V. EVANS
Unfortunately for gay, lesbian and bisexual litigants, lower courts have
240. See id.
241. See Transcript of Oral Arguments, Romer v. Evans, No. 94-1039, 1995 WL
605822, at *4-8.
242. Id. at *4.
243. Id. at *8.
244. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 629-30.
245. See id. at 635.
246. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985); Depart-
ment of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
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seized upon the ambiguity in Romer v. Evans and have continued to uphold
laws which discriminate against homosexuals. What appeared to be a major
victory for gays and lesbians is at best a symbolic victory. In many cases, the
Court's reasoning has been used by lower courts to defeat homosexual liti-
gants. In the district and circuit courts, numerous claims have been brought
by homosexuals challenging various laws discriminating against gays, lesbi-
ans, and bisexuals. Federal courts have almost unanimously cited Romer v.
Evans to uphold legislation discriminating against homosexuals. Cases have
included challenges to laws similar to Amendment 2, challenges to the mili-
tary's Don't Ask Don't Tell policy, and employment discrimination cases. In
all but one district court case, lower courts have validated every law dis-
criminating against homosexuals despite Romer v. Evans.
A. Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati:
Romer v. Evans Revisited
In Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. Cincinnati," the
Sixth Circuit reviewed an amendment to the Cincinnati city charter.248 The
amendment had much the same effect as Amendment 2.2' 9 It provided:
NO SPECIAL CLASS STATUS MAY BE GRANTED BASED UPON
SEXUAL ORIENTATION, CONDUCT OR RELATIONSHIPS. The City
of Cincinnati and its various Boards and Commissions may not enact,
adopt, enforce or administer any ordinance, regulation, rule or policy
which provides that homosexuals, lesbian, or bisexual orientation, status,
conduct, or relationship constitutes, entitles, or otherwise provides a per-
son with the basis to have any claim of minority or protected status, quota
preference or other preferential treatment. This provision of the City
Charter shall in all respects be self-executing. Any ordinance, regulation,
rule or policy enacted before this amendment is adopted that violates the
foregoing prohibition shall be null and void and of no force or effect."0
Before the Court's ruling in Romer v. Evans, the Sixth Circuit upheld
the Cincinnati amendment."' Following Romer v. Evans, the Supreme Court
summarily vacated the decision and remanded the case for further consid-
eration in light of Romer v. Evans. 2 As in Romer v. Evans, Justice Scalia
authored a dissent that was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Thomas. 3 His argument contended Romer v. Evans was not applicable to
247. 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir.), vacated, 518 U.S. 1001 (1996) [hereinafter Equality Foun-
dation I].
248. Seeid. at271.
249. See id. at 263-64.
250. Article XII of City Charter of Cincinnati, quoted in Equality Foundation 1, 54 F.3d
at 264.
251. See Equality Foundation 1, 54 F.3d at 27 1.
252. See Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 518 U.S.
1001 (1996).
253. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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the Cincinnati amendment, and he suggested the Court's holding in Romer v.
Evans was limited to its facts. 4
On remand, the Sixth Circuit affirmed its initial ruling holding the Cin-
cinnati amendment was constitutional. 5 The court took a narrow reading of
Romer v. Evans and distinguished it on three grounds. 6 First, the Sixth Cir-
cuit held that the scope of the Cincinnati amendment was far less sweeping
than Amendment 2.' The Cincinnati amendment went no further than to re-
peal existing legislation and prevent future legislation favoring homosexu-
als. 3 Unlike Amendment 2, the court argued homosexuals were not re-
moved from the general protection of laws. 9 Instead, the Cincinnati
amendment prevented special treatment based on sexual orientation and pre-
vented homosexuals from receiving protected status under antidiscrimination
laws.2"
The court drew from Justice Scalia's dissent in Equality Foundation I
and argued the Cincinnati amendment effected only Cincinnati and was
more narrow in scope than Amendment 2."' The circuit court held that the
Cincinnati amendment passed constitutional muster because it was passed
through the normal legislative process and could be repealed or changed in
the same manner.262 Unlike Amendment 2, which required another amend-
ment to the Colorado constitution to be repealed, the Cincinnati amendment
could be changed by the City Council in the normal political process.263 The
court also found no impermissible purpose to harm homosexuals.2" Instead,
they believed the careful wording of the amendment was passed to prevent
homosexuals from gaining special advantages and protections under the
law.26
To reach its decision, the Sixth Circuit relied primarily on Justice Ken-
nedy's discussion of the political process. 66 He emphasized that the scope of
Amendment 2 was so broad it would require a state constitutional amend-
ment to change the law.26 The circuit court suggested that because the Cin-
cinnati amendment did not go as far as altering the Ohio constitution, the
254. See id.
255. See Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d
289, 301 (1997) [hereinafter Equality Foundation Il].
256. See id. at 295.
257. See id.
258. See id. at 295-96.
259. See id.
260. See id.
261. See id. at 297.
262. See id.
263. See id.
264. See id. at 300.
265. See id. at 295.
266. See id. at 294-98.
267. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 632-33.
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case fell outside the scope of the Court's decision in Romer v. Evans.26 The
effect of Cincinnati's law was much the same as Amendment 2.269 Like
Amendment 2, the Cincinnati amendment denied gays, lesbians, and bisexu-
als the political victories they had already achieved and likely prevented
them from achieving future legislation.27 Despite language in Romer v. Ev-
ans suggesting discrimination against homosexuals was akin to racial dis-
crimination,2' the Sixth Circuit narrowed its focus to the Court's analysis of
the sweeping scope of Amendment 2.' Because the court found the Cincin-
nati Amendment's scope was somewhat more narrow, it distinguished Ro-
mer v. Evans and validated the amendment using the normal rational basis
standard.2
The Sixth Circuit's analysis is not unusual. In other contexts, federal
courts have read Romer v. Evans as narrowly as possible.2 7 Given the un-
usual nature of Amendment 2 it has been easy for courts to distinguish Ro-
mer v. Evans and proceed into ordinary rational basis analysis as the Sixth
Circuit did. The effect on gays, lesbians, and bisexuals has been devastating
as courts have continued to validate laws which discriminate on the basis of
sexual orientation using Bowers v. Hardwick and its progeny. While the
sweeping scope of Amendment 2 gave the Court a relatively easy way to in-
validate Amendment 2, it has also provided lower courts with an easy out.
Courts such as the Sixth Circuit have seized this opportunity and have con-
tinued to validate laws which discriminate against gays, lesbians, and bi-
sexuals even after Romer v. Evans.
B. Does Romer v. Evans Help Gays in the Military?
Prior to 1993, military regulations prevented any person "who engages
in, desires to engage in, or intends to engage in homosexual acts" from
serving in the armed forces.2" Each federal court that reviewed the constitu-
tionality of the regulation upheld it. 6 In 1993, the Secretary of Defense is-
sued a new policy that is currently in effect. 7 The regulation became known
as the "Don't Ask Don't Tell" policy, and no longer required applicants to
the armed forces to disclose their sexual orientation.27" The new regulation
268. See Equality Foundation I1, 128 F.3d at 297.
269. See id. at 296.
270. See id.
271. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 623.
272. See Equality Foundation II, 128 F.3d at 295.
273. See id. at 295-300.
274. See supra Part III.A and infra Part III.B.
275. See Dept. of Defense Dir. No. 1332.14 (1981); 32 C.F.R. Part 41, App. A (1992).
276. See Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 456 (7th Cir. 1989); Woodward v. United
States, 871 F.2d 1068 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Rich v. Secretary of the Army, 735 F.2d 1220 (10th
Cir. 1984).
277. See I PUB. PAPERS 1111 (July 19, 1993); 10 U.S.C. § 654 (1994).
278. See 10 U.S.C. § 654 (1994).
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provided that when a service member stated he/she was a homosexual it cre-
ated a rebuttable presumption that the person making the statement was en-
gaged in homosexual acts in violation of the regulation.2 9 The regulation had
the effect of requiring a service person who had stated previously that he/she
was a homosexual to prove otherwise.2 0 Congress adopted this regulation in
late 1993.28)
Between the time the Don't Ask Don't Tell policy went into effect and
Romer v. Evans was decided by the Supreme Court, federal courts unani-
mously upheld the law as constitutional.2 ' The primary challenge by homo-
sexual military personal was that the Don't Ask Don't Tell policy violated
the First Amendment.283 Before Romer v. Evans, courts had little trouble re-
jecting these claims, arguing that the Don't Ask Don't Tell policy was
geared at restricting conduct, not personal expression, and that it was ration-
ally related to promoting cohesion within the military. 2
Romer v. Evans did little to lower court analysis of the Don't Ask Don't
Tell policy.2" Less than two months after the Court handed down its deci-
sion, lower courts began hearing constitutional challenges to the Don't Ask
Don't Tell policy based on Romer v. Evans.86 In Hrynda v. U.S., a naval re-
serve officer brought suit challenging the policy.2 Her primary claim rested
on Equal Protection grounds.288 The plaintiff argued that the Don't Ask
Don't Tell Policy failed rational basis review because it was grounded in
nothing more than the "presumed prejudices of heterosexual service mem-
bers."'89 In evaluating these claims, the district court noted that rational basis
review was the correct standard of review and it held the policy met this
standard.Y The court's opinion provides little independent analysis. 9 ' The
Court relied on a Ninth Circuit case written before Romer v. Evans, which
upheld the Don't Ask Don't Tell policy." Apparently, the district court
judge believed Romer v. Evans did nothing to change the analysis governing




282. See Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc), cert. denied, 117 S.
Ct. 358 (1996); Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc).
283. See Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 931-33; Steffan, 41 F.3d at 697-99.
284. See Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 931-33; Steffan, 41 F.3d at 697-99.
285. See Philips v. Perry, 106 F.3d 1420 (9th Cir. 1997); Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d
256 (8th Cir. 1996); Hrynda v. United States, 933 F. Supp. 1047 (M.D. Fla. 1996).
286. See Hrynda, 933 F. Supp. at 1047.
287. 933 F. Supp. 1047 (M.D. Fla. 1996).
288. See id. at 1050.
289. See id. at 1052.
290. See id. at 1053.
291. See id. at 1051-54.
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is for the general proposition "that no person shall be denied the equal pro-
tection of the law co-exists with the realization that most legislation classi-
fies for one reason or another, resulting in disadvantage to various groups or
persons." '94
Following Hrynda, Circuit courts addressed the Don't Ask Don't Tell
policy.295 In Richenberg v. Perry, the Eighth Circuit upheld the Don't Ask
Don't Tell policy.296 Like the district court in Hrynda, the Eighth Circuit ig-
nored Romer v. Evans, and did not even mention the opinion in its analy-
sis.291The court felt Romer v. Evans did not apply because the Supreme Court
grounded its holdings in the Equal Protection clause. In contrast, the Eighth
Circuit reached its decision based largely on First Amendment and Due Pro-
cess arguments.298 The court based its decision in large part on what six other
circuits had decided prior to Romer v. Evans."' In the court's eyes, each of
the decisions upholding the Don't Ask Don't Tell policy remained un-
changed by Romer v. Evans.3"
In 1997, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the Don't Ask Don't Tell policy
nearly a year after the Court handed down Romer v. Evans."' Judge Rymer's
majority opinion upheld the policy, arguing that the military might reasona-
bly believe open homosexuality would disrupt normal military operations,
and that the policy furthered the military's objective of insuring uniformity
and orderly operation among units.' The court's failure to mention Romer v.
Evans is surprising considering that a dissent by Judge Fletcher emphasized
the court should have invalidated the Don't Ask Don't Tell policy based pre-
cisely on the Court's reasoning in Romer v. Evans?3 He believed that in
light of Romer v. Evans, the majority could not plausibly hold the military
policy was rationally related to any legitimate interest.304
Following Philips, the Ninth Circuit had another occasion to review the
Don't Ask Don't Tell Policy? 5 In Holmes v. California Army National
Guard, two National Guard soldiers challenged their discharge from the
Army National Guard." 6 Both had outstanding military records and there
were no disciplinary charges against them as a result of any homosexual be-
havior."7 In fact, one of the discharged officers specifically wrote that he had
294. Id. (citing Romer, 517 U.S. at 631).
295. 97 F.3d 256 (8th Cir. 1996).
296. Seeid. at261.
297. See id. at 258-64.
298. See id. at 262-63.
299. See id. at 260-61.
300. See id. at 258-64.
301. See Philips v. Perry, 106 F.3d 1420 (9th Cir. 1997).
302. See id. at 1425-30.
303. See id. at 1432-41 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
304. See id.
305. See Holmes v. California Army National Guard, 124 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 1997).
306. See id.
307. See id. at 1129-31.
[Vol. 35
24
California Western Law Review, Vol. 35 [1998], No. 2, Art. 4
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol35/iss2/4
1999 WAS ROMER v. EVANS REALLY A VICTORY FOR GAY RIGHTS? 295
never engaged in homosexual conduct with another military person and had
no desire to."' Nevertheless, both soldiers were discharged."l The Ninth Cir-
cuit rejected their claims that the Don't Ask Don't Tell Policy was uncon-
stitutional.31 The court relied heavily on the Philips case and precedent of
other circuit courts."' It found these cases dispositive of the issue and held
that the Don't Ask Don't Tell Policy did not violate any provision of the
Constitution."'
Justice Reinhardt dissented."' He agreed with the majority who relied
on the precedent established in Philips."4 However, Justice Reinhardt argued
that Philips was distinguishable."5 He noted that neither plaintiff in the case
now before the court had ever been found to engage in homosexual conduct
and that both had stated they would not engage in such conduct with military
personnel. 6 In Justice Reinhardt's view, conduct was not being punished;
instead the military was punishing the plaintiffs because of mere statements
concerning sexual orientation.3"7
Justice Reinhardt also criticized discrimination against homosexuals."1
He characterized the Don't Ask Don't Tell Policy as a product of a "fickle
public," and argued it was loaded with "[h]ypocrisy and deception."3 '9 He
compared Bowers v. Hardwick to Plessy v. Ferguson and wrote, "I remain
confident that someday a Supreme Court with a sense of fairness and an
adequate vision of the Constitution will repudiate Bowers in the same way
that a wise and fair-minded Court once repudiated Plessy. Indeed, I hope that
day will not be long in coming." '32 Justice Reinhardt also acknowledged the
limitations of Romer v. Evans in achieving equality among homosexuals and
heterosexuals. 2' As his footnote made clear, Romer v. Evans only has appli-
cation in "highly limited circumstances." 3
The concerns of Judge Reinhardt and Judge Fletcher were later echoed
in the District Court for the Eastern District of New York, which invalidated
the Don't Ask Don't Tell policy based largely on Romer v. Evans." In Able
v. United States, Judge Nickerson went beyond the narrow reading of Romer
308. See id. at 1130.
309. See id. at 1129-31.
310. See id. at 1137 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
311. See id. at 1132.
312. See id.
313. See id. at 1137 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
314. See id.
315. See id. at 1137-38.
316. See id. at 1140.
317. See id.
318. See id. at 1139.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 1137.
321. See id. at 1137 n.3.
322. Id.
323. See Able v. United States, 968 F. Supp. 850 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
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v. Evans the Eighth and Ninth Circuits used in upholding the Don't Ask
Don't Tell policy.324 The court cited Romer v. Evans for the proposition that
"government discrimination against homosexuals in and of itself violates the
constitutional guarantee of equal protection."'3 It went on to hold that im-
plicit in the Court's reasoning is the idea that discriminatory legislation
against homosexuals is inherently irrational and invidious if it is based on
nothing more than the fears and prejudices of heterosexuals.326 The court
found the military's Don't Ask Don't Tell policy was based solely on these
fears and prejudices. 7
The United States sought to justify the policy on the ground that it fur-
thered unit cohesion.328 Specifically, it argued that the Don't Ask Don't Tell
policy promoted cohesion by giving heterosexuals a greater feeling of pri-
vacy than forcing them to live in close quarters with homosexuals.329 The
government also contended the policy helped reduce "sexual tension" among
soldiers.33 The court rejected both claims.33' It argued that the government's
privacy claim was fundamentally flawed because it assumed that simply be-
cause no one was out of the closet, members of a unit would conclude there
were no homosexuals in the unit at all.332 This assumption was unlikely in the
court's view because the Don't Ask Don't Tell policy does not exclude ho-
mosexuals altogether.333 Instead, it merely excluded homosexuals who had
come out of the closet and made their homosexuality known.3" The court
was also unpersuaded by the government's "sexual tension" argument, not-
ing that all sexual relationships were subject to disciplinary action when they
were "prejudicial to good order and discipline.""33 In the court's view, the
Don't Ask Don't Tell policy was unnecessary and did not further the mili-
tary's articulated policy.336
The district court went on to contend that both articulated reasons for
the Don't Ask Don't Tell policy were pretexts for overt discrimination
against homosexuals.337 Both Generals Powell and Schwartzkopf acknowl-
edged homosexuals were capable of performing all the duties of other sol-
diers and could serve as "good Americans." '338 But each believed open homo-
324. See id. at 852.
325. Id.
326. See id. at 852, 860.
327. See id. at 860.
328. See id. at 858.
329. See id. at 860.
330. See id.
331. See id. at 861.
332. See id. at 860.
333. See id.
334. See id.
335. See id. at 861.
336. See id.
337. See id.
338. See id. at 858.
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sexuality would be disruptive in the military.339 Based on these statements,
the court concluded the real reasons behind the policy were fear and preju-
dice." In the court's view, such fear and prejudice was similar to the fear
and prejudice faced by interracial couples attempting to adopt children."I
While the court acknowledged the Constitution could not eliminate all dis-
crimination, it argued such discrimination could not be tolerated under any
notion of equal protection.'
After invalidating the Don't Ask Don't Tell policy under rational basis
review using Romer v. Evans, the district court went on to hold homosexuals
were a suspect class deserving of heightened scrutiny. 3 Judge Nickerson
began his analysis by justifying the application of heightened scrutiny.'" He
noted that homosexuals had traditionally suffered discrimination throughout
history and this discrimination was very much alive today. 5 Discrimination
against homosexuals was present during the Congressional hearings over the
military policy.4 6 In his view, this history of discrimination, which was bla-
tantly manifest today, was sufficient reason to protect homosexuals under
strict scrutiny review. 47
Judge Nickerson distinguished Bowers v. Hardwick on the ground that it
was decided on Due Process grounds. 8 Romer v. Evans and Able v. United
States were both decided on Equal Protection grounds. 9 Not surprisingly,
the court concluded a law which could not pass rational basis review could
not satisfy the more demanding strict scrutiny review.3"0
The court's use of strict scrutiny review is odd considering the fact that
the Romer v. Evans Court declined to treat homosexuals as a suspect class
despite arguments by amicus curie."' Moreover, after a lengthy discussion,
the court found the Don't Ask Don't Tell Policy could not withstand even
rational basis review, and it is surprising the court would go so far when it
was unnecessary to invalidate the military's policy.3' The decision may
show a desire by at least some lower courts to expand Romer v. Evans to its
logical limits in an effort to afford homosexuals more protection under the
law. Judge Nickerson's opinion leaves little doubt that he saw the Don't Ask
339. See id.
340. See id. at 859-60.
341. See id. at 859.
342. See id.
343. See id. at 862-64.
344. See id.
345. See id. at 854-55, 862.
346. See id. at 862.
347. See id. at 862, 864.
348. See id. at 864.
349. See id.
350. See id.
351. Romer, 517 U.S. at 623-36.
352. See Able, 968 F. Supp. at 860-61.
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Don't Tell policy as nothing more than a bare desire to harm homosexuals?53
He referred to the Don't Ask Don't Tell policy as "degrading" and "deplor-
able." '354 He went on to criticize the government's arguments supporting the
policy calling the arguments "illogical." '35 In his eyes, the Don't Ask Don't
Tell policy was one designed to encourage "animosity" towards homosexu-
als.35
6
The decision was a clear victory for gays, lesbians, and bisexuals, but
one that was short lived." On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed Judge
Nickerson's opinion.3"8 Using rational basis review, a unanimous court had
little trouble upholding the Don't Ask Don't Tell policy.359 The court pro-
vided little independent analysis for its holding, relying primarily on deci-
sions in other circuits."6° The only real analysis provided by the court was a
general discussion of case law giving great deference to the military. 6' The
court's discussion suggests that issues concerning military personnel that do
not involve some suspect class are subjected to an even weaker form of ra-
tional basis review.362 Oddly, the respondents did not seek to have the Don't
Ask Don't Tell policy reviewed under any standard other than the lenient ra-
tional basis review.363 It is likely this omission was calculated, as courts have
been reluctant to extend suspect classification or individual rights under ei-
ther the Equal Protection Clause or Due Process Clause.3" To date, no circuit
court has recognized homosexuals as a suspect class. Accordingly, no Cir-
cuit Court has reviewed the Don't Ask Don't Tell policy using anything but
rational basis review. In so doing it has been easy for courts to simply rubber
stamp the Don't Ask Don't Tell policy as passing constitutional muster.
The ease with which most courts have dismissed Romer v. Evans when
reviewing the Don't Ask Don't Policy stems from the Supreme Court's pre-
occupation with the scope of Amendment 2. The thrust of Justice Kennedy's
opinion focused on just how broad and sweeping Amendment 2 was, and the
Court had little difficulty finding it unconstitutional for precisely that rea-
son.365 The military's Don't Ask Don't Tell policy is admittedly less sweep-
ing in nature. The policy defines homosexuals to include only individuals





357. See Able v. United States, 155 F.3d 628 (2d Cir. 1998).
358. See id. at 636.
359. See id. at 630-36.
360. See id. at 632.
361. See id. at 632-33.
362. See id.
363. See id. at 632.
364. See generally id.
365. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 623-36.
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who engage in homosexual contact.3" Amendment 2 included not only those
engaged in homosexual conduct but those who held homosexual beliefs or
tendencies regardless of their actions.367 The Don't Ask Don't Tell policy is
more limited because it does not remove homosexuals from protection of
generally applicable laws.36 It excludes only those practicing homosexuals
from a particular government benefit, military employment?69 These distin-
guishing characteristics of the military's Don't Ask Don't Tell policy and
Amendment 2 have made it easy for lower courts to ignore Romer v. Evans.
This reading is not surprising given the fact that the Court itself has
been stingy in extending rights to homosexuals.37 Lower courts have fol-
lowed the Court's lead since Bowers v. Hardwick37' Nevertheless, the effects
of the Don't Ask Don't Tell Policy are significant and sweeping even when
compared against Amendment 2. While the policy would appear to exclude
only those homosexuals who have come out of the closet, it has been used
against closet homosexuals as well.372 Nor can the significance of the gov-
ernment benefit be ignored. The Court itself has recognized this benefit as so
significant that it triggers the Due Process Clause's right to a hearing before
it can be revoked by a government body.373 In other cases, Congress has
sought to protect various classes of citizens from arbitrary discrimination in
the work place.37 While the military's Don't Ask Don't Tell policy does not
remove a class of citizens from the general protection of various laws, it may
have an equally devastating impact on the individuals effected.
The narrow reading courts have given Romer v. Evans is not mandated
by the opinion itself. Quite the contrary. The Court's language supports an
expansion of constitutional protection for homosexuals. 75 Justice Kennedy
begins his analysis by citing Justice Harlan's famous dissent in Plessy v.
Ferguson, in which he stated that the Constitution "neither knows nor toler-
366. See 10 U.S.C. § 654 (1994).
367. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 629-34.
368. See 10 U.S.C. § 654.
369. See id.
370. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
371. See, e.g., Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 684 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1994); High Tech Gays
v. Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563 (1990); Ben Shalom v. Marsh,
881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068 (Fed. Cir. 1989);
Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1987); National Gay Task Force v. Board of Edu-
cation, 729 F.2d 1270, 1273 (10th Cir. 1988).
372. See Jackson v. United States, available in 1997 WL 759144 (9th Cir. 1997). Jack-
son was living with a suspected child molester named Kenneth Lavato. When police entered
their premise with a valid search warrant, they discovered materials indicating that Jackson
was engaged in a homosexual relationship with Lavato. Nothing was found on the premises
suggesting Jackson was a child molester and he was not accused or suspected of such activity.
When the Air Force learned of this, he was honorably discharged. The district court upheld
the discharge and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. See id.
373. See, e.g., Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 108 U.S. 564 (1972).
374. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1994); 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1994); 29 U.S.C. §§
621-634 (1994); 29 U.S.C. §§ 706(8), 791, 793, 794, 794(a) (1994).
375. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 623-36.
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ates classes among citizens."376 He went on to state that "[i]f the constitu-
tional conception of 'equal protection of the laws' means anything, it must at
the very least mean that a bare ... desire to harm a politically unpopular
group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest."3" The Court
concluded by stating that "Amendment 2 classifies homosexuals not to fur-
ther a proper legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone else. This
Colorado cannot do." '378 However, few judges have seized upon this language
to expand the scope of Romer v. Evans. Instead, because the Court used only
rational basis review, Romer v. Evans has, at least in some respects, hindered
those seeking to achieve equality for homosexuals.
If equality is to be achieved in the near future through the courts, propo-
nents of gay rights must present novel arguments to the courts that give
judges the opportunity to review discriminatory laws using some form of
heightened scrutiny. To 'date, litigants have argued that homosexuals be con-
sidered a suspect class like racial minorities. In large part this argument has
gone unrecognized or ignored by courts. But what has not been considered
by litigants or courts is that discrimination against homosexuals is a form of
gender discrimination.
C. Romer v. Evans and Its Impact in Employment Discrimination Cases
Homosexuals are not protected from discriminatory employment deci-
sions based on their sexual orientation under Title VII.37 Title VII only pro-
hibits discrimination based on "race, color, religion, sex, or national ori-
gin. '  Traditionally, many courts refused to acknowledge sexual
harassment as actionable under Title VII.38' In 1986, the Court ruled that
sexual harassment was actionable under Title VII.3 The Court's ruling in
Meritor Savings Bank recognizes two types of sexual harassment are action-
able under Title VII.383 "Quid Pro Quo" sexual harassment occurs when an
employer conditions employment or employment benefits upon the receipt
of sexual favors.34 A hostile environment case arises when an employee al-
leges the work environment is not suitable because of "unwelcome sexual
advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of
a sexual nature."35 Most often, sexual harassment cases arise from alleged
376. Id. at 623.
377. Id. at 634 (quoting Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 543
(1973)).
378. Id. at 635.
379. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994).
380. Id.
381. See Jo Bennett, Same-Sex Sexual Harassment, 6 LAW & SEX. 1, 5-6 (1996).
382. See Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
383. See id.
384. See, e.g., Chamberlin v. 101 Reality, Inc., 915 F.2d 777 (1st Cir. 1990).
385. 29 CFR § 1604.11(a) (1999).
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behavior of a male supervisor or employee against a female employee.386 Re-
cently, federal courts have been faced with claims of same-sex sexual dis-
crimination; that is, male employees complaining of harassment by male su-
pervisors or female employees complaining of harassment by female
supervisors.387 Initially, courts recognized such causes of action even before
the Court's ruling in Meritor Savings Bank.388
Following Meritor Savings Bank, circuit courts divided on whether
same-sex sexual harassment was actionable under Title VII. 9 The issue was
initially addressed by the Fifth Circuit before the Court decided Romer v.
Evans.3"° The court held male on male harassment was not actionable under
Title VII even when accompanied with sexual overtones. 9 ' The court af-
firmed its decision the same day Romer v. Evans was handed down.3"
Other circuit courts followed the Fifth Circuit's lead before the Court
ruled in Romer v. Evans.393 In McWilliams v. Fairfax County Board of Su-
pervisors, the Fourth Circuit ruled that a Title VII hostile work environment
case based on sexual harassment between a male heterosexual supervisor
and a male heterosexual employee was not actionable.394 The Fourth Circuit
reasoned that while such harassment may be deplorable, it cannot be said to
result "because of' the employee's gender as required under Title VII.395
After the Supreme Court's decision in Romer v. Evans, the Eighth Cir-
cuit held same-sex sexual harassment was actionable under Title VII.396 It
reasoned that the key inquiry of any sexual harassment case was whether
386. See Ellen Bravo & Ellen Cassedy, THE 9 TO 5 GUIDE TO COMBATING SEXUAL
HARASSMENT CANDID ADVICE FROM 9 TO 5, NAT'L ASS'N OF WORKING WOMEN 64 (1992)
(stating that male on female sexual harassment is the most common form of sexual harass-
ment, constituting roughly 90% of the sexual harassment cases filed).
387. See, e.g., Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of America, Inc., 99 F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 1996) (Ti-
tle VII allows heterosexual male to maintain cause of action against homosexual supervisor);
Quick v. Donaldson Company Inc., 90 F.3d 1372 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding Title VII recog-
nizes same sex harassment); overturned by Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 118
S. Ct. 998 (1998) (holding same sex sexual harassment not actionable under Title VII);
McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding no
sexual harassment for heterosexual male on male harassment); Torres v. National Precision
Blanking, 943 F. Supp. 952 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (holding same sex harassment not actionable un-
der Title VII).
388. See, e.g., Joyner v. AAA Cooper Transp., 597 F. Supp. 537 (M.D. Ala. 1983), aff'd.
without opinion, 749 F.2d 732 (1 1th Cir. 1984); Wright v. Methodist Youth Services, Inc.,
511 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Barlow v Northwestern Mem'l Hosp., 30 Fair Empl. Prac.
Case (BNA) 223 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
389. See supra note 353.
390. See Garcia v. Elf Atochem North America, 28 F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 1994).
391. See id.
392. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 83 F.3d 118 (5th Cir. 1996).
393. See McWilliams v. Fairfax County Board of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191 (4th Cir.
1996).
394. Id. at 1196.
395. Id. at 1195-96.
396. See Quick v. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372 (8th Cir. 1996).
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unwelcome sexual advances were made." To the court, it was irrelevant that
those advances occurred between heterosexual males.39 Several other cir-
cuits have suggested same-sex sexual harassment is actionable under Title
VII.399
Romer v. Evans did little to change the way lower courts think of em-
ployment discrimination issues concerning gays, lesbians, and bisexuals.
Admittedly, Title VII cases involve issues of statutory interpretation and
Romer v. Evans involved constitutional issues. Nevertheless, lower courts
have classified gays, lesbians, and bisexuals as fundamentally different, and
have subjected them to different treatment based on nothing more than sex-
ual orientation. Following the Fourth Circuit's opinion regarding same-sex
sexual harassment, the court revisited the issue after Romer v. Evans.' Prior
to Romer v. Evans, the Fourth Circuit refused to acknowledge a sexual har-
assment case under Title VII between a male heterosexual employee and a
male heterosexual supervisor." In Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of America, the
Fourth Circuit ruled that an employee of the same gender as his/her supervi-
sor could maintain a Title VII action if the supervisor was a homosexual.'
The Wrightson case and the Fourth Circuit's earlier cases involving same-
sex sexual harassment mean that a homosexual supervisor may be liable and
subject to Title VII for behavior that would not subject a heterosexual to any
liability. 3 Romer v. Evans would have appeared to preclude classifications
which subjected homosexuals to burdens not suffered by heterosexuals but
the Fourth Circuit ignored this teaching as it failed to even cite Romer v. Ev-
ans.4
In 1998, the Supreme Court handed down Oncale v. Sundowner Off-
shore Services, Inc., which ended the split among Circuit Courts. 5 In a
unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Scalia, the Court held that "nothing
in Title VII necessarily bars a claim of discrimination 'because of... sex'
merely because the plaintiff and the defendant (or the person charged with
acting on behalf of the defendant) are of the same sex."' The Court rea-
soned that Title VII required no more than that a person suffer harassment
397. See id. at 1377-78.
398. See id. at 1379.
399. See Baskervill v. Culligan Int'l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 430 (7th Cir. 1995); Steiner v.
Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1463-64 (9th Cir. 1994); Saulpaugh v. Monroe
Community Hosp., 4 F.3d 134, 148 (2d Cir. 1993) (Graafeiland, J., concurring); Bundy v.
Jackson, 641 F.2d 932, 942 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
400. See Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of America, Inc., 99 F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 1996).
401. See supra note 387 and accompanying text.
402. Wrightson, 99 F.3d at 143.
403. See id. at 138. Compare MeWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d
1191 (4th Cir. 1996).
404. See Wrightson, 99 F.3d at 138.
405. 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998).
406. 118 S. Ct. at 1001-02.
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"because of' sex.' 7 The nine justices agreed that the gender of the parties
was largely irrelevant in determining whether this requirement was satis-
fied." Justice Scalia cautioned that not all work place horseplay rose to the
level of sexual harassment.' He explained that while a football coach would
be able to slap a player on the behind, that same act would be actionable if
directed toward the coach's secretary at the office."'
While Oncale settled the dispute between the circuit courts, it did noth-
ing to stop the erosion of Romer v. Evans. The Court purposefully avoided
any reference to Romer in deciding Oncale. Indeed, the author of Oncale,
Justice Scalia, delivered a bitter dissent in Romer v. Evans.
Outside the scope of Title VII, courts have also ignored Romer v. Ev-
ans.4 ' In Shahar v. Bowers, the Georgia Attorney General revoked an em-
ployment offer from Robin Shahar after he learned of a marriage ceremony
to be performed between Shahar and her lesbian lover."' The marriage serv-
ice was to be performed by a local rabbi but would not be legally recognized
under Georgia's marriage law."3 The ceremony was later performed and
Shahar was subsequently notified that her employment offer had been re-
voked."4 The Attorney General justified the decision saying Shahar's deci-
sion showed a lack of judgment, would make it difficult to maintain a sup-
portive working environment within the office, and might create the
appearance of conflicting interpretations of Georgia's sodomy law. 5 With-
out the benefit of the Court's decision in Romer v. Evans, the district court
held the Attorney General's revocation permissible under the Constitution. 6
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed.417 Judge Edmondson's majority opinion
gave scant mention to Romer v. Evans, curtly dismissing the Court's teach-
ings by writing "Romer is about people's condition; this case is about a per-
son's conduct."4 8 It is not clear what the court was trying to say and Judge
Edmondson did not bother to offer any explanation."9 The court rejected
Shahar's argument that the Attorney General's decision should be evaluated
under strict scrutiny review.2 It applied a balancing test, weighing the
State's interest in employing people of its choice against the individual's
407. Id.
408. See id.
409. See 118 S. Ct. at 1002-03.
410. See 118 S. Ct. at 1003.
411. See Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097 (11th Cir. 1997).
412. See id. at 1101.
413. See id. at 1100.
414. See id. at 1100-01.
415. See id. at 1101.
416. See Shahar v. Bowers, 836 F. Supp. 859 (N.D. Ga. 1993).
417. See Shahar v. Bowers, 114F.3d 1097, 1110-11 (11th Cir. 1997).
418. Id. at 1110.
419. See id.
420. See id. at 1102.
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right to exercise constitutional rights.42'
In the court's view, the balance tipped decisively in favor of the State.
22
It noted that an attorney who works for the Attorney General's office was
privy to classified information.4 23 This was of particular concern to the court
in this case because of the ongoing debate in Georgia over homosexual sod-
omy, same sex marriages, and other social and political issues relating to
homosexuals.424 For the purposes of the litigation, the court acknowledged
Shahar's rights of association were "substantial. ' '415 But it found these inter-
ests insufficient to outweigh the State's interest in staffing its offices and
avoiding any conflict of interest that might arise because of Georgia's sod-
omy law and Shahar's homosexuality.426
The court held Romer v. Evans had no impact on the balancing test it
used to evaluate Shahar's claim. 27 In distinguishing Romer v. Evans, the
court noted that Amendment 2 excluded an entire class of people from the
general protection of discrimination law.42 In contrast, the court took the po-
sition that Romer v. Evans was limited to laws classifying homosexuals
based on their sexual orientation.429 It has no application in cases where the
State denies a single person employment based on his/her sexual orienta-
tion. 30
The court's reasoning is suspect. The majority opinion itself sparked
one concurring opinion and four dissenting opinions, each criticizing the
majority opinion on one ground or another.'" Perhaps what is most troubling
in the Shahar opinion is the court's failure to explain why dismissing a gov-
ernment employee because of her lesbian relationship meets the rationale ba-
sis standard set out in Romer v. Evans. Instead, the court purports to balance
Georgia's interest and Shahar's rights, concluding Georgia has a greater in-
terest than Shahar. The court's discussion gives only curt mention to Romer
v. Evans, and the reasoning the Court used to invalidate Amendment 2 does
not enter the Eleventh Circuit's equation. Instead of engaging in any real
analysis, the court summarily concludes that Romer v. Evans has no applica-
tion to the case.
The Eleventh Circuit's treatment of Shahar's claim is consistent with
what other federal court's have done. All the courts interpreting Romer v.
Evans, except one, have found its application limited. Many courts have
421. See id. at 1103-04.
422. See id. at 1110-11.
423. See id. at 1105-06.
424. See id. at 1104.
425. See id. at 1106.
426. See id. at 1108.
427, See id. at 1110.
428. See id.
429. See id. at 1110.
430. See id.
431. See id. at 1111 (Tjoflat, J., concurring), 1118 (Godbold, S.J., dissenting), 1122
(Kravitch, S.J., dissenting), 1125 (Birch, J., dissenting), 1129 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
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failed to even mention Romer v. Evans. Those that have dealt with the case
directly have given it only cursory discussion and have not applied its ra-
tional in any meaningful way. Courts have generally dismissed the case by
arguing that Romer v. Evans is essentially limited to its facts. Accordingly,
most lower courts have concluded that Romer v. Evans has no application in
most gay rights cases.
IV. WHERE THE COURT WENT WRONG IN ROMER V. EVANS: REEVALUATING
LAWS THAT DISCRIMINATE AGAINST HOMOSEXUALS
In many ways Romer v. Evans was a clear victory for gays, lesbians,
and bisexuals. It marked the first time the Court overturned a law discrimi-
nating on the basis of sexual orientation. Justice Kennedy's majority opinion
compared Amendment 2's impact to racial discrimination and suggested that
a naked desire to harm homosexuals was not a valid exercise of state
power.32 The majority opinion itself seemed to undermine the holding and
rationale used in Bowers v. Hardwick.433 The Court did not mention Hard-
wick, apparently believing it had no application to the case.' But since Ro-
mer v. Evans, little has changed. Lower courts have overwhelmingly upheld
laws which discriminate against homosexuals. Except for one district court
opinion holding the military's Don't Ask Don't Tell policy unconstitutional,
every case dealing with gay, lesbian and bisexual rights citing Romer v. Ev-
ans has distinguished the Court's ruling or has ignored its teachings alto-
gether. These courts have often resorted back to the rationale used by the
Court in Hardwick. The reason for this regression results from the Court's
use of rational basis review to invalidate Amendment 2. Lower courts have
found it easy to justify discriminatory laws on the ground that there could be
some reason for the law outside a bare desire to harm homosexuals. With an
overwhelming majority of lower courts still upholding discriminatory laws,
one might well ask what went wrong?
The most obvious answer is that the Court should have reviewed
Amendment 2 using strict scrutiny review. Most of the briefs presented to
the Court argued Amendment 2 was invalid because it burdened a funda-
mental right, or should be reviewed under the strict scrutiny standard be-
cause homosexuals are a suspect class.435 Not surprisingly, the Court de-
clined to address either of these arguments.4" The Court has been reluctant in
expanding suspect class status beyond race, national origin, and alienage.437
432. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 623, 634.
433. See id. at 623-36.
434. See id.
435. See Romer Briefs, supra note 104.
436. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 623-36.
437. See, e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988) (applying intermediate scrutiny to
classifications based on illegitimacy); Cleburne v. Clebume Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985)
(holding mental retardation is not a suspect class but invalidating city's denial of zoning vari-
ance based on mental retardation of applicants); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971)
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It has also been hesitant in recognizing "fundamental rights" which trigger
strict scrutiny review.438 The Court's reluctance to address these arguments
probably stems from the fact that it has never articulated criteria for deter-
mining suspect class status or for determining which rights are fundamental.
Instead, it has dealt with problems on a case by case basis and has only given
factors which are relevant in determining whether a class is suspect or a right
fundamental.439 This uncertainty in the area likely prompted the Justices to
avoid addressing the issue until it could establish more concrete criteria for
determining suspect classification or fundamental rights.
What has not been addressed by the Court or the lower courts since Ro-
mer v. Evans was handed down is the possibility that discrimination against
homosexuals is a form of gender discrimination requiring courts to use in-
termediate scrutiny. This idea is simple: if a homosexual chooses a partner
of the opposite gender instead of a partner of the same gender, the State
would not discriminate. " The argument may be understood by considering
the landmark case of Bowers v. Hardwick"' and some contemporary prob-
lems presented in other cases. In Hardwick, Michael Hardwick was charged
with homosexual sodomy when police executed a valid search warrant and
found him engaged in acts in violation of Georgia's sodomy law." He chal-
lenged the law claiming it violated his right to privacy."3 In a 5-4 decision,
the Court rejected this claim holding that their was no right protected by the
Constitution to engage in homosexual sodomy.4 The Court's ruling was
narrow, it held only that their was no right for homosexuals to engage in
sodomy under the Due Process clause. 5 It did not decide whether hetero-
sexuals had the right to engage in sodomy under the Constitution.'
And there lies the problem. Had Michael Hardwick's partner been fe-
male instead of male, the case would have been easy."7 Indeed, it would
seem the act would have been protected under Griswold v. Connecticut and
its progeny."8 What subjected Michael Hardwick to liability was as much his
(stating classifications based on wealth did not trigger heightened scrutiny).
438. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (declining to recognize homo-
sexual sodomy as a fundamental privacy interest protected under substantive due process);
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (declining to recognize public education as a fundamental
right but acknowledging that it was more than a government benefit); Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471 (1970) (holding there is no fundamental right to welfare benefits).
439. See TRIBE, supra note 22, §§ 16-7 to 16-12, at 1454-65.
440. See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men
Is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 197, 201-02 (1994); Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality
and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 WIs. L. REv. 187 (1988).
441. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
442. See id. at 188.
443. See id.
444. See id. at 191.
445. See id.
446. See id. at 188 n.2.
447. See generally TRIBE, supra note 22, § 15-10, at 1338-62.
448. See generally id.
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choice of a male partner over a female partner as it was the actual act of sod-
omy. One might therefore ask why should Michael Hardwick's choice of a
male partner instead of a female partner subject him to criminal liability?
We might look at the problem from a slightly different angle. Consider
the facts in Shahar v. Bowers. 9 The Georgia Attorney General offered
Robin Shahar employment with his office but revoked that offer when he
learned she was a lesbian and planned to be married in a religious ceremony
to another woman.5 Had the Attorney General refused to hire Robin Shahar
because she was a woman, there is no question that this would have been
considered a form of gender discrimination, and would have been held un-
constitutional by a court applying intermediate scrutiny. Why should a court
not apply the same standard of review when the Attorney General's decision
centers around the gender of the Robin Shahar's life partner? Had Robin
Shahar announced she was marrying a man, no reprisals would have been
taken. Because she married someone of the same gender, her offer for em-
ployment was revoked. How can this be anything but a form of gender dis-
crinilnation?
The idea that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is a form
of gender discrimination is not new and has been argued since at least the
early 1970s.? Until recently, the issue has been ignored by the courts and,
even today, the federal courts have not addressed the argument. Apparently,
few litigants have even made the argument to courts. Instead, they have fo-
cused their arguments around privacy concerns, or have argued that gays and
lesbians should be considered a suspect class based on the abuse and dis-
crimination they have suffered in the past.452 Litigants in Romer v. Evans
used these arguments by claiming that Amendment 2 burdened the funda-
mental right of political participation.453 Yet, the Court was unwilling to ad-
dress this argument and used rational basis review to invalidate Amendment
2.'" What was not argued, and what apparently has not been argued with any
degree of regularity or seriousness in the federal courts, is that discrimina-
tion on the basis of sexual orientation is a form of gender discrimination.
Undoubtedly, some will think the argument ill-conceived and trouble-
some.455 Perhaps this is because most laws the Court has invalidated as dis-
criminating on the basis of gender have burdened one gender in favor of the
other gender.456 That is not the case with laws that discriminate against ho-
449. See supra note 411 and accompanying text.
450. See Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097, 1101 (lth Cir. 1997).
451. See Koppelman, supra note 440, at 199.
452. See, e.g., Brief of Respondents, City of Aspen and City Council of Aspen, Romer v.
Evans, No. 94-1039, 1995 WL 370335; Amicus Brief of Lamda Legal Defense Fund 1995,
Romer v. Evans, No. 94-1039, 1995 WL 782809.
453. See Romer Briefs, supra note 104.
454. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 623-36.
455. See, e.g., Massaro, supra note 179, at 81-83.
456. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (invalidating Oklahoma statute which
prohibited alcohol sales to males under age 21 and females under age 18); Reed v. Reed, 404
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mosexuals. Both gay men and women are impacted equally by such laws.
Laws which discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation nevertheless dis-
criminate against a class of people based on traditional notions of the rela-
tionships between men and women. Most heterosexuals who are opposed to
homosexual behavior find nothing wrong with the same activities when the
gender of one partner changes. A number of heterosexuals find it offensive
to see two gay lovers holding hands or kissing in a public park. For many
heterosexuals, the very idea of one man performing oral sex on another man
in private is so offensive that the State should outlaw such behavior. As
Chief Justice Burger succinctly stated in his concurring opinion in Bowers v.
Hardwick, homosexual sodomy is "the infamous crime against nature."4
Yet, the same acts and practices offend few when they occur between a het-
erosexual couple. Few people would advocate a law barring heterosexuals
from holding hands or kissing in the park, and it is almost certain the Court
would invalidate any such attempt. What is clear is that laws discriminating
against homosexuals spring from popular notions that men and women
should be together and that people of the same gender should not be together
in intimate relationships. In an effort to preserve these traditional notions of
morality, voters enact laws like Amendment 2. The purpose of such laws is
to preserve traditional notions of morality, and while this purpose might be
sufficient to satisfy rational basis review, it is probably not sufficient to
withstand intermediate scrutiny.
The Court has looked at laws which attempt to preserve traditional no-
tions of morality with a skeptical eye when they are based on suspect classes
such as race, or quasi suspect classes such as gender.458 In Loving v. Virginia,
for example, a Virginia law prohibited inter-racial marriages.459 The State de-
fended the law on the ground that it affected blacks and whites equally.'
The Court saw through the smoke screen and invalidated the law, reasoning
that the law was nothing more than an attempt to preserve traditional notions
of "racial integrity."'" In the Court's eyes, simply because citizens found the
idea of interracial couples offensive did not give it a sufficient interest in
preventing interracial marriages.' 2
The same reasoning should be applied to laws discriminating against
homosexuals. The fact that laws discriminating against homosexuals burden
men and women equally is unimportant. 3 What is significant is the fact that
U.S. 71 (1971) (invalidating Idaho statute which provided that as between persons equally
qualified to administer estates, males must be preferred to females).
457. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 197 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (quoting 4 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON LAw 215 (1978) (emphasis in original)).
458. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
459. See id.
460. See id. at 7-8.
461. Id.
462. See id. at 12.
463. See id. at 7-8.
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societal attitudes concerning relationships between men and women are the
frame work used to pass laws discriminating against homosexuals.4"
Litigants rarely make such arguments, and the courts don't even seem
aware of the logic. This point might best be illustrated by Judge Fletcher's
dissenting opinion in Philips v. Perry. 5 Philips challenged the military's
Don't Ask Don't Tell policy after he was discharged. 6 The Ninth Circuit
upheld the policy. 7 Judge Fletcher dissented, arguing that Philips discharge
was unconstitutional because had Philips' partner been female instead of
male, his acts would not have been covered under the military's policy."' In
Judge Fletcher's words, "[I]t is clear that Philips would not have been dis-
charged had his sexual partners been women rather than men.""46 Ironically,
he did not apply intermediate scrutiny.47 He would have invalidated the
Don't Ask Don't Tell policy using only rational basis review."' But he did
not even explain why a law which discriminated against Philips because he
chose to have intimate relationships with men and not women should be re-
viewed under the rational basis standard and not the intermediate scrutiny
standard used by courts in gender discrimination cases. 7
The Court has used this standard when military regulations classify a
soldier's dependents on the basis of gender. In Frontiero v. Richardson, a
military regulation gave benefits automatically to women who were depend-
ents of men in the armed forces. 73 Men who were dependents of women in
the armed forces had to make an actual showing that they were legally de-
pendent to receive the same benefits. 74 The Court applied strict scrutiny to
invalidate the regulation, 5 although today the Court would likely apply in-
termediate scrutiny to invalidate the regulation.7 Implicit in the Court's rea-
soning is the idea that regardless of the gender of the actual service person,
classifications based on the gender of his/her partner are still subject to some
form of heightened scrutiny. 7 In Philips v. Perry, had the military denied
Philips' dependents benefits based on their gender, the Court would have in-
validated the regulation using intermediate scrutiny."7 That same scrutiny
464. See id.
465. 106 F.3d 1420, 1432 (9th Cir. 1996) (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
466. See id. at 1421.
467. See id.





473. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
474. See id. at 680.
475. See id. at 682.
476. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). After Frontiero, the Court reviewed gen-
der discrimination cases under intermediate scrutiny. See id.
477. See Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 688.
478. See id.
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should be used by courts when government benefits are denied to homo-
sexuals based on the gender of their partners.
The Hawaii Supreme Court recently used similar reasoning in a differ-
ent context.4" The Hawaii court recently reviewed the state marriage statute
restricting marriage licenses to those couples of the opposite gender.4"' Gay
and lesbian couples challenged the statute, contending that it burdened the
fundamental right of marriage and was a form of gender discrimination."'
The court refused to find same sex marriage a fundamental right which trig-
gered strict scrutiny." It reasoned strict scrutiny review was appropriate un-
der Hawaii's state constitution because the statute classified citizens based
on their gender.83 Like the Loving Court, the Hawaii court found it irrelevant
that the statute applied equally to men and women. 84 Underlying the court's
analysis is the idea that the State cannot use gender classifications to deny a
group equal protection under the law without triggering heightened scru-
tiny.
485
The idea that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is a form
of gender discrimination requiring courts to use intermediate scrutiny finds
support outside of Hawaii 86 Commentators have long recognized the power
of the argument and its potential significance in gay rights litigation.'4' Even
those commentators who do not favor any form of heightened scrutiny have
acknowledged the difficulties with rejecting the gender discrimination argu-
ment.488
The gender discrimination argument is not precluded by the Court's de-
cision in Romer v. Evans. Litigants did not argue that Amendment 2 was a
form of gender discrimination.89 The only arguments before the Court were
that Amendment 2 burdened a fundamental right and that the Court should
treat homosexuals as a suspect class.4'9 The Court expressed no opinion on
the gender discrimination issue.4'' The gender discrimination argument may
even supplement what the Court said in Romer v. Evans. Justice Kennedy is
surely right that no State may classify citizens in a way that denies a certain
group protection under the law,4 but neither should a law escape intermedi-
ate scrutiny by the courts when it discriminates by classifying citizens on the
479. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
480. See id. at 55.
481. See id. at 48-50.
482. See id. at 57.
483. See id. at 68.
484. See id.
485. See id. at 64-68.
486. See generally Koppelman, supra note 440; Law, supra note 440.
487. See generally Koppelman, supra note 440; Law, supra note 440.
488. See, e.g., Massaro, supra note 179.
489. See Romer Briefs, supra note 104.
490. See id.
491. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 623-36.
492. See id. at 623.
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basis of gender choices.
The gender discrimination argument also avoids many of the pitfalls of
Bowers v. Hardwick. The Hardwick Court was careful to ground its decision
solely on the Due Process Clause.493 The Court expressed no opinion con-
cerning any Equal Protection challenges to the Georgia sodomy law.49 Spe-
cifically, the Court held the Constitution's Due Process clause did not pro-
tect homosexual sodomy; but the Justices expressed no opinion as to
whether heterosexual sodomy was a protected right.495 The argument that
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is a form of gender dis-
crimination is grounded in the Equal Protection clause and does not rely on
Due Process analysis for its strength. Thus, issues may be framed without
reference to Hardwick, and Hardwick may be easily distinguished by liti-
gants and courts.
The argument that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is a
form of gender discrimination has application to almost every law which
discriminates on the basis of sexual orientation. Cincinnati's amendment re-
pealing all legislation preventing discrimination on the basis of sexual ori-
entation, the military's Don't Ask Don't Tell policy, and state employers
that discriminate against homosexuals would be reviewed under intermediate
scrutiny. The Court's recent cases using intermediate scrutiny make it un-
likely that any of the laws or employment practices listed above would sur-
vive constitutional analysis by a court faithfully applying the intermediate
scrutiny standard.
This argument has added value because it gives litigants novel ap-
proaches to achieving equality. Courts have been reluctant to address argu-
ments claiming homosexuals are a protected class or that laws that discrimi-
nate against them burden some fundamental right.496 Courts which have
addressed such arguments have generally ruled in ways unfavorable to gays,
lesbians, and homosexuals.4" This argument presents courts with a simpler
alternative than deciphering fundamental rights or determining suspect class
status from a variety of factors and cases. It merely asks courts to apply al-
ready existing case law to statutes and government decisions which dis-
criminate on the basis of sexual orientation. The link between gender dis-
crimination and homosexuality is direct: "But for" two partners being the of
the same gender, the state would not discriminate against the couple. If the
gender of one of the partners changes, the State would no longer discrimi-
493. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 188 n.2.
494. See id. at 186-97.
495. See id. at 188 n.2.
496. See, e.g., Romer, 517 U.S. at 620; Bowers, 478 U.S. at 186.
497. See, e.g., Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 684 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1994); High Tech Gays
v. Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, reh'g denied, 909 F.2d 375
(9th Cir. 1990); Ben Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989); Woodward v. United
States, 871 F.2d 1068 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Na-
tional Gay Task Force v. Board of Education, 729 F.2d 1270, 1273 (10th Cir. 1988), aff'd
mem., 470 U.S. 903 (1985). But see Able v. U.S. 968 F. Supp. 850 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
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nate against the couple.
V. CONCLUSION
Romer v. Evans was an important step in the fight for gay rights, giving
homosexuals their most significant victory in the federal courts. However,
reliance on that case is unlikely to produce future victories for homosexuals.
Lower courts have ignored Romer v. Evans whenever possible and have
rarely relied on it to invalidate laws discriminating on the basis of sexual
orientation. Litigants and courts should take seriously the argument that dis-
crimination on the basis of sexual orientation is a form of gender discrimi-
nation.
42
California Western Law Review, Vol. 35 [1998], No. 2, Art. 4
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol35/iss2/4
